The second group argues that Turkey's changing foreign policy towards Iran can best be explained by analysing the changes in Turkey's domestic politics. 4 A majority of these studies present Turkey's new foreign policy vision in the AKP period as a departure point from the 1980s and 1990s. In this sense, strategic depth doctrine of Turkey's foreign policy is presented as the main determinant of its changing foreign policy behaviour towards its neighbours including Iran. 5 Apart from strategic depth, ruling elite's foreign policy role conceptions, role of ideology, Kurdish collective identity, Turkey's changing domestic and foreign security perceptions are presented as significant determinants of bilateral relations. 6 A third group of studies take multiple elements into consideration, suggesting that the interplay of domestic factors with the regional and international systems is significant to understand relations between Iran and Turkey. 7 For instance, Sinkaya argues that rationalization of foreign policy approaches in Turkey and Iran, together with a supportive regional environment paved the way for rapprochement between two states. 8 Hale examines how the inauguration of Obama as the US's new president, and appointment of Davutoğlu as Turkey's new foreign minister have an impact on the Middle Eastern politics. 9 The article put emphasis on both global and regional developments, as well as
Turkey's zero problem with its neighbours policy. Calabrese analyses turbulent relations between Turkey and Iran which he considers to be crucial for the stability and prosperity of the Middle East. The article analyses many international (unipolarity and globalization), regional (Arab-Israeli conflict, defeat of Iraq and the Gulf War, independence of some Central Asian states), and domestic factors (ideology) as determinants of friendly/ conflictual relations between Turkey and Iran. 10 In his book on Turkey-Iran relations after the Islamic Revolution, Elik also analyses many factors, including the impact of the Cold War, Central Asia and the Caucasus policies, economic ties, religion and Turkey's PKK question. In line with these assessments, this study focuses on the change in Turkey's elitelevel discourse about Islamic fundamentalism as a threat, and Iran as an external source of this threat. It aims to contribute to the literature that analyses the domestic determinants of Turkey's Iran policy. To this aim, the study first clarifies the theoretical framework, as well as data collection and analysis. Then, it makes an analysis of Turkish elites' securitizing speeches throughout the 1990s within which Iran was referred to as a threat to Turkey's national unity and regime security. Second, it examines the desecuritization of Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to Turkey's survival during the first decade of the 2000s. It traces the change in Turkey's political structure that made desecuritization possible. The last part analyses the positive transformation in Turkish-Iranian relations by focusing on the AKP elites' foreign policy vision as an initiator of rapprochement, and change in public opinion, as well as an increase in bilateral political and economic relations as determinants of change.
12 Taking Turkey's Iran policy as its case, the study contributes to the wider literature on the link between domestic politics and foreign policy by utilizing a security framework.
Theory and method
The concept and framework of securitization was developed by the group of scholars who worked at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute to find an answer to the question 'What makes something a security issue?' 13 The concept of securitization came as an answer to this question, which is considered as a major constructivist challenge to the traditional security approach that is based on a realist understanding. Securitization means 'to present an issue as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure'.
14 In other words, securitization refers to a process within which an actor transforms a certain issue into a matter of security. According to this approach, security is not an objective and material condition, it is rather an intersubjective act, socially constructed via language. Thus, as the Copenhagen School argues, 'something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so'. 15 If a securitizing actor presents an issue as an existential security threat, requiring the use of extraordinary means, emergency measures and other actions outside normal political conditions, it begins to be considered as a security issue/threat. 16 For a securitization move to become fully successful, the target audience should accept and identify that issue as a security threat. This is why public opinion surveys are also reviewed in this study. normal bargaining processes of the political sphere'. 17 It is a process in which 'a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat'. 18 Some scholars argue that the concept of desecuritization is undertheorized and understudied comparing to securitization. 19 In this sense, some scholars take lack of securitizing speeches as desecuritization, while others look for the existence of positive speeches or practices. This study applies a combination of these two approaches. I analyse speeches of influential actors in Turkish politics (i.e. presidents, prime ministers, generals, representatives) since securitization is basically defined as 'a speech act'. In this manner, I essentially review Turkish newspapers Milliyet and Cumhuriyet between 1990-2002, and 2002-2011 with the keywords 'Islamic fundamentalism (irtica), threat (tehdit), Iran'. The logic behind the selection of these particular newspapers is that (1) they are two of the popular local newspapers of the time, (2) they have online archives and tools that allow the researcher make advanced search. It is also relevant to mention that the assassinations of Turkish intellectuals some of whom were members of Cumhuriyet was an important element of the crisis between Turkey and Iran during the 1990s. Milliyet, on the other hand, was considered to be a 'mainstream' newspaper in terms of its political position.
There were 75 related news reports in Cumhuriyet, and 80 in Milliyet that included all three keywords in the former time period. In the 2000s, only 26 news reports in total were published in these newspapers which contain the same keywords, and 23 of them are about how Iran and/or Islamic fundamentalism were removed from the list of national threats. 20 Furthermore, the study presents political and social context within which securitization and desecuritization became possible in order not to fall into trap of reductionism by focusing only on what elites say. 29 Soner Gurel, and Tolga Sardan, 'Emniyet'ten "Iran'a Dikkat" Raporu', Milliyet, February 7, 1994.
Iran was also officially accused over the assassinations of several Turkish intellectuals in the mid-1990s. The general directorate of security affairs prepared a report titled 'Terrorism and Turkey' which highlighted Iran's impact on Islamist terrorist movements in Turkey. According to the report, the group named themselves as Islamic Movement Organization, which was believed to be responsible for the assassinations of Turkish intellectuals, was 'a counterintelligence project of the Iranian intelligence service, rather than a terrorist organization'. 30 The report claimed that 'After the Islamic Revolution, Iran wanted to export its regime to Turkey, and this is why many fundamentalist Islamic groups appeared, especially in the Eastern and South-Eastern cities of Turkey'. 31 In 1996, the leader of Islamic Movement Organization confessed after his arrest that his organization had ties with Iran. This caused a diplomatic crisis between the two neighbours, because of which eight Iranian diplomats being expelled. When RP came to power as the biggest coalition partner, elite concerns reached a peak. It was the first time in the Republic's history that a party with an openly religious orientation acceded to power. He made his first foreign trip to Iran and claimed that neither Iran nor Syria was sponsoring PKK terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, despite receiving MIT reports that indicated the opposite. 32 RP's Erbakan's attitude towards Iran and his discourse towards Islamic fundamentalism divided the military and bureaucratic elites' approaches towards Iran. RP was accused of undermining the secular regime, while a considerable number of people believed that the coalition government was collaborating with Iran's Ayatollah in exporting Iran's Islamic regime. 33 These accusations legitimized the belief that Turkish military had to act to protect Turkey's unity and solidarity.
There was an increase in the number of news reports that were presenting Iran as a threat to Turkey's national security after the Refah-Yol coalition came into power in 1996, indicating the link between domestic fears and threat perception from foreign sources. Such tradition has been present in Turkish politics since its very foundation. The incidents that brought Turkey to the verge of the fourth military intervention of the Republic started hereby. The Sincan incident had set another peak of ideological tensions between Turkey and Iran. In 1997, 'Night for Jerusalem (Al-Quds Night)' which had been originally declared by Khomeini in 1980 as an anniversary for the Iranian Islamic Revolution, was organized in Sincan, Ankara. The then mayor of Sincan, Bekir Yıldız, was an ideological and political supporter of RP. 34 forces defined the Sincan incident as a challenge to Turkey's secular regime and identity and an attack on the essential features of the Turkish Republic. Mayor Yıldız was sentenced 4 years and 6 months in prison, with 11 bureaucrats also being found guilty and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. Nurettin Sirin, a journalist in Selam newspaper, was given the longest sentence. He was sentenced to 17 years of imprisonment. Army's intervention started the 28 February process in Turkey, within which conservative gestures and events were highly seen as threat to the secular character of the regime.
Not surprisingly, February 1997 MGK meeting was the longest until then, resulting in an 18-point memorandum.
36 Contrary to the usual practice, the memorandum had the characteristics of a command rather than a recommendation. The most important topics concerned Koran courses and schools, suspicious actions of religious groups, application of the dress code and limitations on Islamic capital. 37 At the same meeting, generals declared that 'fundamental Islamist movements which threaten Turkey's secular democratic regime are linked to Iran', and 'Iran's attempts that would destabilize Turkey's regime should be monitored'.
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The diplomatic crisis eased with the establishment of the 55th government, which was a coalition of ANAP, DSP and DTP after the February 28 crisis. However, it was not enough for friendly relations. 39 In Majority of the Turkish public and politicians supported the reforms that AKP initiated, which paved the way for desecuritization of Islamic fundamentalism. When the government presented an amendment for removal of headscarf ban in public institutions after elected, 75.5% of Turkish people were supportive of this initiative. Although in 2004 AKP made a proposition to remove the headscarf ban in educational institutions, the issue remained unsolved for the following years due to the disagreement between political elites. 48 The government planned another reform regarding the higher education system that included proposals to increase the efficiency of Imam-Hatip Schools. That reform package was also shelved due to then-President Sezer's rejection. When the military initiated a so-called 'e-coup' 49 on 27th of April after these developments, Erdogan refused to back down, deciding instead to stand up to the military by calling early elections in which AKP took 46.47% of the total votes and got re-elected. Furthermore, by 2009, only 5.45% of the Turkish public indicated that Turkey's first priority in foreign policy should be 'to prevent attacks on Turkey's secular structure'. 50 However, in March 2008, another proposal demanded political bans of five years for 71 AKP members, including Gul. The court's verdict cut the party's public financing in half but did not close the party. By the election campaign in 2011, the party consolidated its power over the three forces that threatened its survival and agenda after 2002: the presidency, high judiciary, and military. The Higher Education Council prohibited all universities from preventing students from attending classes for students' attitudes against disciplinary regulations. This decision paved the way for allowing freedom of dress in public universities, thereby in a sense legalizing the headscarf. However, the restrictive dress code for broader public institutions remained. Confrontation reappeared in the second half of the 2000s when President Sezer claimed that Islamic fundamentalism was a threat to Turkey's unity. Increasing visibility of Islam in Turkey's public sphere intensified some secular elites' anxiety regarding Islamization of Turkey's political and social environment. When asked about Sezer's speech, Erdogan said that 'Fundamentalism exists in every religion and it is a problem for all of them. However, there is not a fundamentalist Islam threat in Turkey'. 51 Security discourse is generally part of a power struggle between actors of domestic politics. Islamic fundamentalism and Iran had been claimed as threats to Turkey for many years mainly because of the struggle for power and authority between policymakers. Turkey's bureaucratic and military elites have separately believed that they are responsible for maintaining political and cultural order and modernization since the nineteenth century. 52 This perception has caused mistrust between civil and military elites. The competition over responsibility to rule caused them to further securitize particular issues. Ataturk's secularist, modernist and republican principles constituted a crucial commitment for the military, forming the basis for the perception that military was responsible for protecting the secular republic sometimes against the will of civilian Europeanization process and changing political culture also led to the formation and participation of NGOs in decision-making in Turkey. 60 Civil society took advantage of the democratization process imposed by the EU to become increasingly involved in issues concerning politics and security. This affected foreign policy-making in Turkey in both political and economic terms. Non-state actors' involvement in political issues further demilitarized and desecuritized political domestic and foreign issues since they claimed to be presenting the public's voice. Furthermore, Turkey's foreign and security-related issues became more linked to economic concerns. 61 TOBB, TUSIAD and MUSIAD for instance, are businessmen's organizations that have had a notable impact on foreign policy decisions. As Ovalı argues, not only economic and political organizations but also think tanks such as SETA and TESEV have become more influential in certain foreign policy issues. 62 In a sense, desecuritization can never be really successful because it is not possible to convince every group within society. 63 Thus, in the early 2000s there were cases that indicate ongoing concerns related to Islamic fundamentalist movements in Turkey. However, the general spirit within Turkey, and of Turkish-Iranian relations was considerably more positive in the AKP period.
New foreign policy vision and rapprochement with Iran
Alienation of Iran in Turkey's foreign policy slowed down starting from the 2000s. 64 Despite its decreasing role, MGK continued to give briefings warning against Islamic fundamentalism and Iran and bringing up AKP's roots in RP as a source of the threat. In these briefings, the issue of AKP bureaucrats that had relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia was discussed, where it was claimed that Islamic fundamentalist groups considered AKP power as signalling permission to continue their terrorist activities, suggesting that this perception needed to be prevented. 65 There were also concerned circles within the civilian elite. Ecevit put their viewpoint forth while saying, 'Before the elections, I indicated that AKP might be a threat to the regime. I am still anxious'. 66 The public also took external threats very seriously because they believed that Turkey's geopolitical position made it a target for 'enemies' around, which was also why the public accepted the perception that Iran's Islamic Revolution was a threat to the secular republic. 67 Despite concerns of certain circles, development of friendly relations with Iran had continued smoothly until the eruption of the Arab Uprisings. AKP elites believed that political Islam can create a supra-identity acting as a common ground for solving the problems in the Muslim world, and aimed to develop intense interactions with Iran. 68 Political rhetoric made it possible to deconstruct negative perceptions towards Iran and to convince the public that such a shift in Turkey's political behaviour is essential for it to increase and consolidate its power and prestige internationally. MFA Davutoglu's 'new foreign policy' initiative paved the way for desecuritizing discourse and foreign policy practices. By the end of the 2000s, not only policymakers but also the public appeared to seek friendly relations with the former enemy. Other indicators of desecuritization are the changes about Iran in National Security Policy Document of Turkey energy trade and security agreements signed with Iran, the administration's support for its neighbour's nuclear while rejecting Western demands for economic sanctions towards Iran, increasing interactions on trade and tourism. 69 Change in the principles and the methods of Turkey's foreign policy in the AKP period has mostly been associated with then-MFA Davutoglu, who believes that historical and geographical composition of a state remain constant while all other elements of foreign policy should be considered as dynamic and open to change. For Davutoglu, historical and geographical elements are significant while making a rational evaluation of a country's potential and its ability to adapt to new conditions. 70 Aras argues that priorly Turkey's foreign policy elites tended to establish a connection between domestic threats and the foreign policy agenda that strengthened their own privileged positions, with the effect of gradually distancing the country from its near abroad. In contrast, 'new foreign policy' is structured on the basis of 'a novel geographic imagination' that avoided the alienation of neighbour states. 71 This reconstruction of Turkey's neighbours' images enabled Turkey to overcome the obstacles that were previously created by domestic policy considerations. By abandoning the 'bordering and othering' view in foreign policy, Turkey could actively engage in regional affairs. 72 Thus, the Ottoman history that has previously been ignored in Turkish foreign policy is perceived as an asset by AKP elites. Davutoglu set five main principles of Turkish foreign policy, all paved the way for active and positive relations with Iran. First, 'Balance between security and freedom' is summarized as 'Now, security is, from outside and inside, much less of an issue for Turkey'. 73 Second, 'zero problems with the neighbors' aims at problem-free relations with Armenia, Greece, Cyprus, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Russia. Third, 'proactive/preventive peace diplomacy' in both neighbouring regions and globally, which calls for active engagement with all regional systems in Turkey's neighbourhood. The fourth principle, 'rhythmic diplomacy' refers to active engagement in global and international issues, together with increased presence and activism in all international and regional organizations. The fifth principle, 'multi-dimensional foreign policy' refers to multipolar characteristics of the world in the post-Cold War, and disadvantages of choosing a bloc.
These goals and principles seemed to influence Turkey's Iran policy positively according to various indicators. In the 2002 revision of MGSB, in comparison to the way it was mentioned in the 1997 MGSB, 'Iran was covertly referred to as a source of threat given its aspirations to develop nuclear power and WMDs and its continued support for the PKK'. 74 Thus, although the document still mentioned Iran, the level of emphasis on Iran as a source of threat decreased in general and the main focus of the Iranian threat changed completely. While WMDs and PKK were considered as security problems (related to Iran), Islamic fundamentalism was removed from the list of threats. This changed at least the referent object from the secular regime to other spheres, such as territorial integrity and political stability. In March 2005, the 300-page draft of the next document was sent to those who were concerned, which started clashes on the content. In the part relating to Islamic fundamentalism, Iran was not mentioned as an external supporter. The most remarkable change in the document was about Iran. In the previous document, the part concerning Middle Eastern states stated that 'Iran's attempts to export Islamic regime to Turkey and its support to Islamic fundamentalist groups should be prevented'. However, this part was revised in a more positive way: 'Relations with Iran should be based on the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and the friendly neighborhood relations principles'.
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During the 1990s, MGSB had rewritten twice to identify Islamic fundamentalism as one of the two primary threats for internal security, along with Kurdish separatism. 76 As
Bilgin suggests, although the military was not the most central actor in the preparation of MGSB, it had an 'unquestioned authority over security knowledge and security speak'. 77 This made it possible throughout the 1990s and in the early 2000s for military's vision to be dominant in the document. Following a change in military's position in Turkish politics, and abolishment of Islamic fundamentalism from the list of internal threats, Gul wanted MGSB to be re-written in light of the foreign policy principle of 'zero problems with neighbors' in 2010. 78 His and AKP's aim was to remove the word 'Islamic fundamentalism' totally from the text and to acquit Muslim neighbours in the Middle East of being a threat for the Republic. Accordingly, in October, the threat of 'Islamic fundamentalism' was replaced with 'organizations using Islam as a political means'. 79 Additionally, away from being referred to as a source of PKK threat, the document contained a call for cooperation with Iran on PKK terror. While the MGSB of 2005 included both PKK and Islamic fundamentalism as domestic threats, MGSB of 2010 excluded Islamic fundamentalism from the list of domestic threats. Instead, the document mentioned 'radical groups exploiting religion'. Desecuritization of domestic political disputes and reshaping of socially constructed enemy images have affected Turkish elites' posture and discourse towards Iran. Throughout the 2000s, Turkish and Iranian politicians increased the frequency of bilateral visits. In the early 2000s, when Turkey aimed at strengthening its ties with its Middle Eastern Muslim neighbours, it had to make cost-benefit calculations to balance relations with the West and the East. However, the impact of structural constraints on Turkish foreign policy decreased in the following years, due to the rising self-confidence of AKP, mainly as a result of public support. In June 2006, Gul made a visit to Tehran and the next month he went to Washington, when Condoleezza Rice, praised Turkey's mediating role in the Iranian nuclear issue. The U.S. continued to support Turkey's role as mediator between Iran and the West regarding Iran's nuclear programme. As Obama put it, 'I believe that Turkey can be an important player in trying to move Iran in that direction [abiding by international rules and norms]'. 80 According to Aras and Karakaya, Turkey's involvement in Iran's nuclear power issue has broken up the threat-security issue in two ways. First, Turkey has stopped defining Iran as an 'external other' and a source of its domestic problems. Second, the elimination of 'others' has increased Turkey's self-confidence in foreign policy. 81 There has also been a shift in Turkish elites' rhetoric regarding Turkey's dependency on the U.S. in its foreign policy choices. However, Turkey's constant rejection of sanctions on Iran stirred up criticism from the West. In June 2010, Turkey voted against UNSC resolution 1929, which proposed the fourth round of sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear programme. Erdogan administration's posture contradicted 'U.S. and Israeli policies of preventing nuclearization of a "rogue" regime that could pose an "existential" threat to Israel'. 82 Despite such criticism from the U.S., Turkish government's discourse did not change much. On his visit to the European Political Center at Brussels, Erdogan responded angrily to Western demands to reduce economic relations with Iran, claiming that
We will never cut our relations with Iran. No one can define our policy. Turkey is not a tribal state. Turkey is a powerful country that has a great history. Therefore, we decide our destiny, we take our decisions. No one can determine to whom we will talk and to whom we will not. 83 This speech did not only reflect a political decision taken by foreign policy elites but it also Turkish public's ideas on Iran's nuclear power. According to the poll conducted by Transatlantic Trends, as in past years, Turkey was the least worried about Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. What is significant is 'only 48% of Turks were troubled by this possibility, representing a ten-point increase over the previous year'. 84 The rapprochement was not result of a one-sided initiative though. AKP elites have continuously counselled the leaders and groups of Islamic countries which evoked Iranian leaders' positive attitude. Started to play an active role in regional organizations of the Middle East. A Turkish national was elected as Secretary General of the OIC and this was further considered a sign of Turkey's changing approach towards the Middle East. In the D-8 Summit in 2004, former Iranian President Khatami emphasized Turkey and Iran's common regional security concerns, by saying 'Turkey's security means Iran's security'. 85 Following a visit to Tehran, Erdogan also stated that
We have conducted very fruitful negotiations with the Iranians. We are giving the utmost importance to our relations with Iran in all issues. Our relations continue to develop the principles of good neighborhood and non-interference in domestic politics. We had a strategy when we took over the government. We would improve our relations with our neighbors. Turkey and Iran are two important players in regional politics. We can together do many things for regional peace. The share of natural gas in Turkish-Iranian trade relations has been particularly significant for political ties. Before 2002, Turkey purchased less than 4% of its natural gas requirements from Iran. In contrast, new contracts throughout the AKP period have increased the overall volume of natural gas trade between Iran and Turkey steadily. 94 Iran became the second largest natural gas suppliers of Turkey, following Russia. 95 During the 2000s, Erdogan and Ahmadinejad continually stated their willingness to develop broader bilateral cooperation on energy, security, transportation, and industry. Erdogan stated that Both countries' investors share the same economic concerns and future prospects. We are really happy with the rise of bilateral trade to over $10 billion. To increase the volume more, we as the politicians will eliminate the barriers, and the investors will do the rest. When we attain a trading volume of $30 billion, Turkey and Iran will be in a very advanced situation'. 96 In a meeting in Ankara, Turkish side described Iran and Turkey as two great states of the Middle East. The representative added, 'Turkey and Iran's common history and civilization is the most important reason for having close relations', and 'These two neighboring countries should enjoy the most expanded border cooperation and opening the doors of new border customs posts is especially important for the expansion of cooperation'. 
Conclusion
Change in Turkey's foreign policy towards Iran from the 1990s to the 2000s was remarkable. While Iran's regime was considered as a threat to national security in the 1990s, two states became close partners in politics and economy in the following decade. This study finds out how Turkey's domestic political considerations influence this change in its foreign policy preferences and practices towards Iran. Analysing Turkey's domestic political environment in these two decades, the study offers that Turkish elites securitized the Islamist regime of Iran in the pre-AKP period, which had implications for the tensions in bilateral relations between two states. When the new political elites of AKP government started to define national security in a different way, it became possible to build friendly relations with Iran. Thus, the study claims that the desecuritization of Islamic fundamentalism in domestic politics paved the way for a rapprochement between two states. Starting from 2002, cooperation in politics and security, as well as bilateral economic and trade relations, bilateral visits, and connection between two states' societies had increased. This rapprochement was accompanied by an elite-level discourse that presents Iran as a friend and ally in the region.
The main question of this study is 'How did the desecuritization of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey's domestic politics influence its foreign policy towards Iran?'. Answering such question, it finds out that securitization of Islamic fundamentalism in domestic politics influenced Turkey's Iran policy in a negative way, while change in elite perceptions regarding Islamic fundamentalism threat in Turkey paved the way for rapprochement between two states. In this sense, this research makes two contributions, one theoretical, and one empirical. Theoretically, it contributes to the literature that analyses the link between domestic politics and foreign policy by utilizing a securitization framework that is generally used to understand only domestic politics. The study suggests that securitization framework can be a useful tool to analyse the domestic political roots of foreign policy behaviours of states. Empirically, the study contributes to the literature on Turkish politics and foreign policy by focusing on elite discourse and state practices in two successive decades. This way, it observes the change in foreign policy discourse and practices. Moreover, merging domestic and foreign political concerns is a very common practice in world politics. In this sense, the study reveals insights on understanding current foreign policy issues, including Turkey's political discourse and foreign policy behaviour towards the European Union and the Middle East. By making such linkage via a securitization framework, this study can open up new areas of analysis for the study of both securitization and foreign policy.
By its main problematic and research question, this study focuses on the process in which securitization and desecuritization of Islamic fundamentalism became possible in Turkish politics, and how these changes influenced its Iran policy. It specifically aimed to find out 'how come' Turkey and Iran became close friends in the 2000s despite their conflictual relations in the 1990s. In this sense, it does not specifically focus on the reasons or causes behind the change in Turkey's foreign policy, but rather looks at the process in which Islamic fundamentalism and Iran had been constructed as threats, and how this threat perception was deconstructed by the new elites. However, one may consider this study as a starting point to understand the context and to build up another research that analyses possible reasons behind such shift in Turkey's foreign policy. Referring to the research that this article conducts, change in elite identity, power shift between military and civilian elites, and Davutoğlu's new foreign policy might be tested as possible causes that led to a positive change in Turkey's Iran policy in the 2000s.
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